THE DUTY OF A LANDOWNER TOWARDS THOSE ENTERING HIS PREMISES OF THEIR OWN RIGHT.
III.
As has been seen, the general principle of tort law which
imposes upon any one who does an act which he should
realize will create an undue risk of injury to a determinate
class of persons, the liability to answer for any harm resulting therefrom to a member of that class, has to a large extent
prevailed over a landowner's originally complete immunity
in respect to any acts done by him on his own premises,
unless such acts were criminal or quasi criminal in character.
It remains to consider the liability of the owner to persons injured by the bad physical condition of his property.
A defective physical condition of a premises may be one
whose harmful effects extend beyond the boundaries of the
premises itself, or it may be one whose effects are so restricted that it threatens harm only to persons coming upon
the premises. It may cause an injury to persons or property within or without the premises.
Persons injured within a premises by a dangerous condition thereon may come upon it either with or without the
consent of the owner. Those coming upon premises with
the owner's consent may come by his invitation or by his
permission; the purpose of their visit may be connected with
the owner's business or social use of his premises or may have
no relation thereto, being to serve some purely personal.
purpose of the visitor. Those coming without the owner's
consent may come as trespassers, having no right or privilege to enter, or they may come in the exercise of some right
or privilege given them in derogation of the owner's right of
exclusive possession. Such right or privilege may arise out
of some antecedent misconduct of the owner, or because the
purpose of the entry is of such social importance as to require
the owner's right to yield to public necessity, or by some
custom or long-continued adverse user which creates in them
a right of way.
(340)
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Mere ownership of land crc'e.es no duty to put it in such
physical condition as to be harmless to others. No one can
complain of an injury to his person or property which is
due to the unchanged natural condition of another's land.,
But any act done by the owner with or upon his land
gives rise to duties and lialihities varying with the nature
of the act.2 If an owner erc'ts buildings or makes improvements artificially changing the natural condition of his land,
he is not only bound to see that the improvements as planned
shall do no harm to others in the exercise of their legal
rights, but he and his successors are bound to maintain
them in such condition as to render such harm improbable.
It is therefore universal law that an owner is bound to keep
the structures upon his premises in such repair that they
may not fall.upon. his neighbor's land or upon an adjacent
highway to the injury of the public lawfully travelling
thereon.
But an owner, who has improved his land by erecting
buildings upon it or by artificially changing its natural condition, as for example by building a roadway over it, does
not by that act necessarily assume any obligations -either
as to its plan or maintenance toward those whom he admits
to his premises. Since he can exclude them, since they
have no right to admittance save through his consent, he
can attach such conditions as he sees fit to their admittance. •
The relation between them is voluntary and not of right.
So, as in all voluntary relations, even the most favored-class
of visitors can ask no more than full knowledge of the condition of the premises which they are allowed to enter.$
The owner's duty rises no higher than that of making the
appearance conform to the reality, of making the condition
as good as it looks, or of bringing to the knowledge of the
visitor that it is as bad as it is. The visitor, having no right
to enter the premises, is not entitled to find it safe for his
I Woodruff v. Fisher, 17, Barb. 224 (N. Y. 1833): Roberts v. Ilarrison,
t0 Ga. 773 (1897); and see Giles %-.Walker, L. R, 24 Q. B. D. 656 (t89o).
I See Bud v. Elwes, 18 L. T. N. S. 727 (Eng. :868) and Crowhurst v.
Burial Board. L.R. 4 Ex. Div. (1878).
'See Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 Harv.Law Rev. 14, 91 (1906).
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visit; he is only entitled to know its real condition so that he
may intelligently make up his mind to accept or reject the
owner's permission to enter it.
The trend of decisions is to divide those whose right to
enter an owner's premises is derived solely from the owner's
consent into two classes: - the first, commonly called "invitees" or "business invitees," being those in whose visit
the owner has some interest, business or otherwise; the
second, commonly alled "licensees" or "bare licensees,"
being those to whom he accords his consent out of mere
grace, their visit being for their own purely personal purposes. 4
The position of the "business guest" is somewhat better
than that of the "bare licensee." While the owner is bound
to disclose to both any defect of which he knows and which
he should recognize as creating a risk of injury to either, he
may assume that the bare licensee, knowing that the owner
has no interest in his visit, and therefore cannot be expected
to have made special preparations for his coming, will be on
the alert to discover for himself the true condition of the
premises; while a business guest, being entitled to expect to
find the premises put in order for his visit, is not to be expected to discover defects unusual in a properly prepared
business premises. And the owner, having an interest in
the "business invitee's" visit, must by inspection ascertain.
the actual condition of the premises, so that ignorance due
to a failure in inspection will not excuse his failure to give
warning, while he owes no such duty to a bare licensee, it
being immaterial that it would cost the owner a very slight
effort to make an effective inspection and that it would be
impossible for the licensee to -make such an inspection in
the course of his very temporary use of the- premises.'
It is a curious fact that until the question of the right
of policemen, firemen and other governmental officials to
'See
of P. Law.
'Sce
of P. Law

"The Basis of Affirmative Obligation in the Law of Torts" 53 U.
Rev. 2o9, at pages 223-229.
"The Basis of Affirmative Obligation in the Law of Torts" 53 U.
Rev. 2o9i at pages 223-229.
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recover for injuries caused by the defective condition of
private premises which their official duties required them
to enter came before the American courts,6 no case had required any court to pass on the question of the duty of a
landowner toward those who entered his property in the
exercise of some right or privilege thereover, which was
itself in derogation of the otherwise complete right of an
owner to exclude from his land any one he saw fit.?
' The first case in which the right of a public officer to recover for injury
caused by the dangerous condition of premises which he had entered in the
performance of his duty was Low v. G. T. R. 72 Me. 313 (i8fi), where the
Court held that a United States Customs officer was a business invitee, while
he was prowling about a dock in search of smugglers. The next case was Learoyd,
Executor v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315 (1885), in which it was held, that theappearance of a part of the premises, even though not a "wrought avenue," indicating
that it was the intended mode of approach to the buildings thereon, could,
like a wrought avenue, have "held out exactly as great an invitation to the
public having lawful occasion to visit the tenement when some one else lived
there, as though the defendant" (the landlord who had lt thetenement as
apartments reserving control of the approaches thereto) "had done so" himself.
In Woods v. Lloyd, i6 At. 43 (1888), where a widow of a policeman proved that
her husband had been killed while pursuing a disorderly person, by falling over
the unprotected edge of the lot to the street below, the "precipice" being caused
by
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Whether that line of cases, which hold that an owner is
not bound to exercise any care to fit his premises for the
possible entrance of firemen, policemen and other public
officials having as such the right of entry, are or are not
-correct expositions of law-it seems quite clear that the
theory on which the existence of the duty is denied is untenable. - If the public officer is not an "invitee" because
his right to enter does not depend on an invitatioh extended
to him and because he enters, even if summoned by the
owner, in performance of his duty as public officer and not
in acceptance of the invitation, it is equally clear that he
is not a "licensee" of the owner, since his entry is no more
referable to a permission than to an invitation. Such an
officer may be entitled to the same, or to a less or greater
protection than a "licensee" has the right to demand, but
the measure of care owing to him cannot be satisfactorily
determined by calling him a "licensee," after elaborately
and conclusively demonstrating that his right does not depend upon the owner's consent,$ upon which the status of
"licensee" depends as fully as that of "business invitee."
On the other hand, the opinion of the New York. Court
of Appeals in Meiers v. Koch" Brewery,' while avoiding this
error, gives no reason for the existence of the broad general
duty which it imposes on landowners to use reasonable care.
8This reasoning is most fully stated in Lunt v. Post Printing Co. 48 Colo.
316 (lgio), but it appears in some form in practically all the cases denying recovery to firemen and policemen. It is importint to note that in that part of
Cooley on rorts p. 313, cited to show that firemen are licensees-the distinguished
a:uthor is dealing with a landowner's right of complete and exclusive dominidn.
lie divides those licenses which justify another's entry into threeclasses, implied,
express and by the law. lie makes no distinction between invitation and permission, nor does he attach any importance to the purpose of the licensee's visit.
Ilis statements neither have nor are intended to have-any relation to the right of
the three classes of licensee& to expect or require the landowner to take care for
their protection. Thus a definition of licensee, which is intended only to classify
a particular form of justification for an entry, is added to a quite different classtfication of invitees and licensees, stated in Sweeney v. R. R. as determiningthe
duty of the landowvner toward them. In a word the American cases, denying
recovery to persons having an independent right of entry on another's land,
are basd on a definition of licensees never intended to apply to the determination
of the owner's duty toward them and a distinction drawn between invitation and
license, which is contrary to the English Cases and which has been abandoned
in the very jurist',ictioa in which it originated.
SSince the publication of the first parts of this article this case has been
reported in 229 N: Y. io.
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to keep a- road upon his premises prepared as a means of
access to the buildings thereon "in a reasonably safe condition
for those using it" (in a right independent of the owner's
consent) "as it was intended to be used." Thus it is in
sharp conflict with the decision and dicta in many -American
jurisdictions. It gives no reason for the duty which it
recognizes; they give an obviously erroneous reason for denying the existence of such a duty.
In some respects the position of a person injured upon
another's premises, while in the exercise of a right of entry
whose existence does not depend on the owner's consent,
is analogous to that of an owner of land or traveller upon
a highway injured by the fall of a defectively constructed
or maintained building on an adjoining or abutting premises. In both cas6s the injury is due to the bad state of
artificial conditions created-by the owner or his predecessors;
in both the person injured is at the place when the injury
occurs in the exercise of a legal right of his own, which in
no way depends on the owner's consent for its existence.
In other respects his position is like that of a business
invitee or licensee. In both cases, the injury is sustained on
the premises and in consequence of the injured person's
use of he defective thing.
If the liability of a landowner toward those owning property or enjoying the public right of travelling a highway
abutting upon his property is based upon any general principle of law and is not a survival of the concept that the
King's law, like international law today, was peculiarly concerned with the contracts between landowners, regarded as
-in many respects sovereign within their own boundaries,
it is upon that vaguest of all legal maxims, "Sic utere tuo W alienurn non lacdas"-"in the use of one's own rights one must
not injure others in the exercise of their rights." This
should apply as fully to those injured in the exercise of
rights which bring them into the premises of another and
so into contact with a danger created by that other on his
premises in the course of his use thercof. as it does to one
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injured on his own property by the fall of a cornice from
his neighbor's house or to a man similarly injured upon a
highway.
The fact that the injury was caused by the plaintiff's
use of the defective road should not be of decisive importance. Where the right'or privilege to use another's property, whether by permission of the owner or in some independent right of the user, carries with it the possession of
the property--or the right of access to it, not only for its
use but also for its preparation for safe use, it seems settled
law that the duty of preparing and maintaining it in safe
condition rests on the user. So a customary right of way
is reparable by those entitled to enjoy it,10 and they are

entitled not only to use the way but to enter the servient
tenement in so far as this is necessary to enable them to
repair the way.1' Such cases differ radically from those in
which the right is one of occasional and temporary use
for a particular purpose. Such right carries with it no right
to enter except when the conditions arise which require or'
justify the entry. There is no ancillary right of antecedent
entry to prepare or repair the locus of .the privilege. While
it may be proper to impose on those having the power to
perform it the duty of taking such steps as may be necessary
to secure their safety in the use of another's property, it
is quite a different thing to impose such duty in the teeth
of a known and obvious inability to perform it.
And it would seem that the mere fact that the injury
is sustained within the premises rather than outside it should
also be immaterial." So long. as the King's law stopped,
0The Laws of England (Halsbury) Vol. II. p. 294 § 575 and cases cited
innote The Laws of England (Ilalsbury) Vol. 1I. p. 294-5
§ 575 and cases cited
in note (r).
."THs fact has, perhaps naturally, been given an undue importance.
When the injury is sustained outside of the premises there is no need for the
sufferer to prove that, as against the landowner, he had any right to be at the
place of injury. But when he is hurt on another's premises, to clear himself
of being a trespasser, who as such can obviously have no right to expect or demand protection, he must prove his right to come on the premises. Since the
right to enter without or against the owner's consent is rare and exceptional.
in the vast majoriy of cases he.can only do this by showing that the owner had,
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as it did in its early stages of development, while the powei
of the crown was feeble, short at the boundaries of the
domains of private landowners, dealing as international law
now deals with the contacts between what were in effect
separate sovereignties, the fact that the injury was received
without rather than within the premises might well be controlling. But the power of the State has now no such limitation. And it is therefore an anachronism to carry over
into modern law a distinction based on conditions which
have long since disappeared.

As has been seen, the landowner's original immunity
from responsibility for acts done on his premises, itself

based on this concept that the landowner was sovereign
within his own boundaries, has been seriously curtailed by
modern decisions,:' and there is no greater reason to regard
as controlling the archaic idea of his right as -sovereign to
determine for himself in what physical condition he shall
maintain his premises.
Indeed this concept has yielded- to social necessity in
one very important class of cases. There can be no greater
inroad in an owner's right to maintain his premises in such
condition as he sees fit than to make him answerable
for injuries caused by its condition to trespassers, who without right of their own or the consent of the owner intrude
themselves upon his premises. Yet a large majority of
common law jurisdictions hold landowners liable to infant
trespassers injured while playing on, about or with artificial structures or conditions erected or created by the
by some invitation or permission expressly or impliedly given him, consented
to his entry. In such cases (and practically no others had come up for decision
till the right of public officers was raised in the line of cases now under discussion)
the plaintiff
could
justify
his entry
by showing
theowner's
owner'sduties
consent
andfixed
his
entry
being by
theonly
owner's
consent,
his rights
and the
were
by the expressed or implied terms and conditions of the invitation or permission.
Thus there grew up an assuniption that a landowner owed no duty of care in
refard to the physic condition of his premises to any person other than those
whom he chose to admit thereon. But In the exceptional case where the Injured
man n show that he has a right of his own to enter and so does not have to
rely on the owner's consent as fixing the existence and extent of their respective
rights and duties, the fact that the injury is received on rather than off the
premises should be immaterial.
"3Ante 69 U. of Pa. Law Rev. pp. 237 to 252-(March, 1921).
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owner upon his own premises, whether for his pleasure or
for his business purpose.1 ' This has been criticized as an
exhibition of excessive humanitarianism,, but it seems rather
to be a natural response to a public sentiment which is
justified by the grave risk to a numerous and socially important class of citizens and the comparatively slight burden
placed upon the landowner.- It would be impossible to
minutely examine the present state of law on this subject
in all the common law jurisdictions. The decisions show an

effort to hammer out of a compromise between the interest
of society in preserving the safety of its children and the
legitimate interest of landowners to use their land for their
own purposes with reasonable freedom, and so are naturally
in a state of flux and motion. They show an effort to arrive
at a workable compromise, rather than an enunciation of
definite and settled rules capable of automatic applica14See the cases cited in the notes to Ryan v. Towar, Bohlen's Cases on
Torts 403. and in the notes to Keep v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R., Ames &
Smith's Cases on Torts (Pound's Edition) 168.
"6See the able and interesting article b" Hon. Jeremiah Smith on "Liability of Landowners to Children entering without permission" ii llarv. Law Rev.
349, 434.
".Compare the prevalent modern tendency to require landowners in their
Use of their property to consider the safety of tolerated intruders (ante 69 U.
of Pa. Law Rev. pp. 248 to 252, especially p. 251). And just as courts attempt
to conform this new practice to the old formula that toward trespassers and even
lirensees the owner owes no duty except to refrain from inflicting intentional,
Rilful or wanton injury upon them, by calling such tolerated intruders "licensees
by acquiescence," and by dubbing, as "wanton" or "wilful," acts which lack
any of these qualities necessary to constitute wantoness or wilfulness, so they
s-ek to bring the innovation in favor of the trespassiig children into apparent
conformity with abandoned concepts by calling the attractive but dangerous
condition a "trap' or "allurement" or treating it as an invitation to enter.
Yet even if it is a "trap," in the sense in which that term is used to denote a
danger known to the owner and unknown to a visitor, there still remains the
necessity of proving the infant's right to come within its reach. And mere
knowledge that a csoible adult trespass r is ignorant of a pitfall on the land is
not enough to nmake the owner answerable if he trespass and fall into it. The
word "allurement" implies in ever" other connection a thing clone with the
purpose of alluring, and the word "invitation" also implies'an act done or condition created %hich is at least capable of being construed into an expression of
desire to receive the person invited. Every one of these phrases ig merely a
perversion of language-in each the real underlying idea is that the defendants
know that children will be unable to resist the temptation to intrude and will
in their intrusion encounter conditions, which of themselves might warn adults
of the danger lurking therein, but convey no such warning to -their childish
inexperience.
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tion to the particular facts of each case as it occurs.17 But
they show certain rather definite tendencies, on the one
hand, to look at things as they are rather than in a spirit of
Blackstonian optimism which shuts its eyes to the immense
prevalence of minor lawlessness, particularly on the part of
those who are too young to be bound by the rules of society,
and to the impossibility of expecting the poor to exercise
any effective supervision over their young, and thus to
reject the suggestion which may appear theoretically sound
but which is in practice unworkable, that it is the primary
duty of parents to care for their children and that, if they
prove unable to perform this duty, it is the State's duty
to provide safe playgrounds and parks where children may
play without danger; but on the other hand, to recognize the
owner's right to use his land, for his business purposes or
even for his pleasure or whim, more or less as he pleases

within reasonable limits.
It is, therefore, generally required either that the condition with which the child tampers is one which is itself
unnecessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the property,
or that if the structure is itself useful that it could be made
safe even for children without either interfering with its
practical use or without an expense which would impose
a real burden and reaction upon the owner's use,"1 or else
37In many jurisdictions which enthusiastically adopted the broad principle underlying the first "turntable cases," Stout v. R. R., 17 Wall. 657 (1873),
have shown a marked tendency to restrict its application, sometimes at points
more or le. arbitrarily drawn, as for instance, the restriction of liability -to
things, which are "attractive to children by their love of motion, 'by means
other than their own locomotion';" Pekin v. McMahon, 154 I1. 141 (1895);
and see Cent. Branch 11. P. R. R. v. Ilerrigh, 23 Kan. 347 (188o); and thecases
cited in note 4 to Ryan v. Towar, Bohlen's Cases on Torts, 403, p. 408; and
compare Iiltham v. Johnson, L. R. (19t3) I K. B. 398 and hardy v. Central
London Ry. 32 T. L. R. 843 (C. A. Eng. 1920) with Cooke v. Gt. Western Ry.,
L. It.(9o9t) A. C. 229.
On the other hand jurisdictions which refused to follow Stout v. R. R.
in cases presenting substantially identical facts have shown a distinct tendency
to give a very liberal protection to infant trespassers injured while meddling with
other kinds of dangers; compare Carr v. So. Traction Co., 253 .Pa. 27, (1916)
with Thompson v. It. R., 218 Pa. 444 (1907); and see, for a valuable discussioa
of the Pennsylvania Iaw on this subject, the opinion of Keller, J. in Balser v.
Young, 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 502 -(1919).
11See C. I. & Q. R. R. v. Krayenbuhl. 65 Neb. 889 (1902) and United
Zinc Co. v. Britt, 264 Fed. 758 (1920). in which the court emphasized the fact
that the pool, containing poisonous chemicals into which the ptaintiff fell, was
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that if the condition is useful and the structure cannot be
made safe without undue interference with the owner's use
of it and without undue expense, that access to it could
readily be prevented.19 And again, there is a tendency to
restrict the owner's liability to conditions, which though
they might warn adults of their danger, convey no such
intimation to inexperienced children and to deny recoveiy
where it is obvious that the injured child appreciated the
danger and meddled with it -in a spirit of bravado and to
show off his recklessness to his comrades.20
It is, therefore, submitted that the duty which the
opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Meiers v. Koch,
imposes on landowners is justified by the principles which
underlie the whole subject of the varying duties of landowners to the various persons affected by the good or bad
condition of the artificial improvements made upon their
premises, and that it is also sound in limiting the duty of
the owner toward those who have a right in themselves to
enter his premises, to the use of reasonable care in regard to
only so much of his premises as he has prepared a way or
approach, which as such and from the preparation put upon
it indicates that it is intended to be so used by all who have
the right to enter the premises.
It would be an obviously unreasonable burden to impose on landowners to require them to keep the whole of
their premises in such condition as to make every part of
it safe for those whose unusual and exceptional right. of
no longer of any ecnnomic use, the plant having been abandoned and dismantled.
In the original turntable case, Stout v. R. R., 17 Wall. 657, Hunt, J. said p. 662.
-It was not shown that this 'locking the turntable' would cause any particular
expense or inconveniences to the defendant."
"See Hardy v. Central London Ry., 32 T. L. R. 843 (C. A. Eng. 1920).
Rodgers
5
v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475 ("89); Edgingtonv. R. R.,
36Iowa 400
019o2) per Weaver, J. P. 436-; Brickley Car Co. v. Cooper, 7o Ark. 331 (1901);
George v. Los Angeles Ry., 126 Cal. 357 (18g)
21Compare the tendency (ante 69 U. ofPa. Law Rev. p. 250) to restrict
the duty of owners toward tolerated intruders to particular and limited areas
over which their intrusions have become habitual; and see Voods v. Miller,
3o App. Div. 232 (N. Y. i898), vhere the Court emphasizes the injustice of requiring an owner to fence his roof for the sole purpose of preventing firemen from
falling, if their duty should happen to require them to use the roof as a platform
from which to fight a fire on an adjoining property; and se also Woods v.Lloyd.
16 Ad. 43 (Pa. 1888) and Greenville v. Pitts, 102 Tex. i (1902).
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entry may never accrue. 21 The broad range of such a
duty, the. impossibility of forecasting the precise point to
which the officer's duties may call him, the infrequency of
his probable visits, all clearly preclude the idea that the
balance of social benefit can require such a serious restriction on the owner's use of his land, or justify the imposition
,of such a burden on his exchequer, to prevent so vague a
risk of so improbable an injury.
Thus limited the decision imposes far less onerous burdens on landowners for the protection of persons legally
entitled to enter than are imposed by even those courts
who go least far in protecting infant trespassers. Landowners are required to take precautions whose sole purpose
is the protection of children, precautions which they'owe
to no other class of persons likely to come on their premises,
by consent or otherwise. The duty applies at large to every
part of their property known to be open to the incursions
of children and appropriated by them for their-own use as
a playground. The duty to persons lawfully coming on
the premises is restricted to a small and definite area, appropriated, and prepared by the owner himself as the way
to be used by'persons lawfully coming thereon. This area
is fixed by the will of the owner not by the desires or needs
of those entitled to enter his premises. And this duty imposes no new restriction on the owner's use of his land-it
imposes no burden of new expense. It is universally held
that he is under a duty to his "business invitees" to take as
much or more care. The opinion in Meiers v. Koch Brewery, therefore, requires him to do nothing which he is not
universally regarded as bound to do-to incur no expense
which the proper performance of his universally recognized
duty to "business invitees" would not require. At most it
imposes a new liability for the neglect of what he is admittedly bound to do-'a new penalty for the breach of an
old duty. It does not make the proper use of his land more
expensive; at most it makes it more costly to misuse it.
For other reasons it seems proper to require the owner
to use even greater care for the protection of a public officer
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entitled to enter his land to perform his public duties than
he is required to exercise for the protection of infant trespassers. If an owner must expect a young child to yield
to the temptation, which an attractive but dangerous condition on his land puts upon the child, the temptation operating upon the child's natural instincts as the ."piece of
stinking meat" did upon the dog in Townsend v. WVathen,22
he should be as much if not more bound to expect a fireman
or policeman to enter in the performance of his duty. The
.duty of such an officer is as strong a compulsion and the
compulsion should not be regarded as aless important factor,
because his response to it is obligatory, lawful and necessary
to the protection of society, instead of an unlawful, if excusable, yielding to a temptation too strong for the nonexistent or undeveloped social sense of the dog or child.
It is quite clear that when the purpose of the plaintiff's
visit is such as would make him a "business invitee" had
he been employed by a personal employer, he does not forfeit this status because he is employed by a municipality
which, has chosen to carry on activities, such as furnishing
gas or water 3 or collecting garbage2' which might well have
been left to private enterprise.26
n9
East 277(0808).
' As in Toomey v. Sanborn, 148 Mass. 28 (M898).
So where the city
entered into a contract for construction work which required the presence of a
city engineer to inspect the work as it progresses, such engineer is as much a
"business invitee" while at the scene of the work as though the work was being
done under a similar contract for a private individual, Pickwick v. McAuliffe,
193 Mas3. 70 (1906).
24As in Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works, 159 Mass. 311 (1893) and
Kennedy v. lieisen, 182 I1. App. 200 (1913).
2s' The suggestion which occurs first in Lunt v. Post Printing Co., 48 Col0:
316, p. 338, that a public officer, unlike the servants of a private master should
look solely to the governmental agency, whose public duties he is performing.
for relief is entirely opposed to the trend of modern legislation regulating the
right and obligations of employees and employers inter se. Practically all of
the many Workmen's Compensation Acts which have beer enacted throughout
-the United States within the last ten years, while requiring employers to pay
compentation irrespective of their own, the employee's, or a third person a
neglhgence, preserve the liability of a third party whose misconduct has caused
the employee's injury or death. They give to the injured employee the right
to recover from such third person, either in addition or as an alternative to their
right to demand compensation from their employers. And the employer who
has paid or is liable to pay compensation is given the benefit of the employee's
right of action in some acts, for example that of New York, by transferring the
employee's right of action to the employer, if the employee claim compensation

OWNER'S DUTY TO THOSE RIGHTFULLY ON PREMISES 353

But under the facts of that case the decisions not only
of the English Courts but of a large number of American
jurisdictions-' would have supported the result on narrower
grounds. The defendant had dug a coal hole halfway across
the driveway which it had left open. On the night of the
accident the electric lights which the defendant had placed
along the drive to light it were not lighted. Had they been
lit, they would have disclosed the pitfall and enabled the
plaintiff to avoid it. The drive was not closed to traffic
at night, indeed the fact that the defendant had thought
fit to place lights upon it would seem to indicate that it
was intended to be used at night as well as by day, and
there was direct evidence that it was so used by at least one
person who filled all the requirements of a "business invitee." Thus no question was raised as to whether the
defendant should go to the expense of lighting the road
from him, in others, as in the Pennsylvania Act of t955, by subrogating the
employer to the employee's rights against the delinquent third person, to the
extent of the compensation paid or payable by the employer. It is unthinkable
that had the.plaintiff in the Lunt case, been injured on the highway while on
his way to the fire by a car recklessly driven, Justice Musser would have held
that he must look to the generosity of the city for redress.
In the same opinion pp. 337, 338 the additional argument is advanced
against permitting the widow of a fireman to recover for his death front suffocation by chemical fumes erroneously thought by the defendant's employee to be
smoke front a fire, that if the owner owed any duties to firemen, that This would
call for reciprocal duties from the firemen and thus their work would be hampered
and their minds diverted by the consideration of their private duties." It is
submitted that the court in holding that a fireman owed no duty to the owner,
upon whose property he is performing his functions, confukes him with the governmental agency, which he is serving and which as such and while exercising its
olice power is undoubtedly immune from legally enforceable liability. But it
has never been suggested that a police officer is entitled to a personal immunity
for wrongful acts even though done in good faith in the performance of his duty.
And while the "stress and excitement" of a fire and the necessity of prompt
decision would nattralli, create an emergency which would excuse mere errors
of judgment, it is submitted that a fireman while performing his duties is not a
chartered libertine free to injure private prolerty at his own whim and caprice.
and should not be made an outlaw and a wolf's heid to whom no man owesany
duty of care.
The very fact that the Colorado Court thought it necessary to boster up
its principal theory by arguments so manifestly unsound of itself lessens the
weight of its opinion.
2 See Rallestone v. Casirer, 3 Ga. App. 16t 09o7): Hill v. President &
Trustees, 6z Ore. 190 (1912); Brin kson v. Chicago R. R. Co., z44 Wis. 614
(1911); Campbell v. Boyd. 88 N. C. 129 (1883); in Union Pac. R. R. v. Mclonahl. 152 U. S. a62 (8g 93 ) and Penso v. lccormick, 125 Ind. 116 (1890)
the injured licensee was a child, but the language of the Court as equally appli-

cable to adults.
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in anticipation of the highly unlikely possibility that a fire
on his own or some adjacent property would require firemen
to drive over the way. The condition of the driveway thus
fell directly within the definition of a "trap" given by Hamilton, L. J. in Latham v. Johnson. 27 "A trap," he said, "is
a figure of speech not a formula. It involves the idea of
concealment and surprise, of an appearance of safety under
circumstances cloaking a reality of danger." The English
cases both by decision and dicta:* uniformly support the
Lord Justice's further statement that "owners and occupiers
alike expose licensees and visitors to traps on their premises
at their peril." 29 And the trap need not be laid for the
27L. R. (1913) 1 K. B. 398, p. 415.

21Bramwell B. in Southcote v. Stanley. i H. & N. 247 (18s6): Wilde B.
in Bolch v. Smith, 7 H..& N. 736 (1862); Willes J. in Gantret .v. Egerton, L.
R. 2 C. P. 371 (1867); Willes J.in Corby v.Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556 (1858). So
one who lends a chattel to another is bound to arn him of a concealed defect
thereon known to the lender, McCarthy v. Young, 6 H. & N. 329 (x86z) per
Wilde J. It is extraordinary that so decent and sensible a view has been rejected
by any court even by dicta. While a donee of the use of another's property real
or personal perhapi ought not to expect the owner to specially prepre it for his
use, yet he is entitled by the usages of decent society to expect that his donor
will act in good faith and will not in the guise of giving a favorimpose acurse.
No such doctrine is applied to the gift of the use of chattels. Even a manufacturer or vendor is liable to the purchaser of his wares through a middleman,
if he conceals a defect therein known to him or fails to disclose one, whose existence is not discoverable by such inspection as the purchaser ought to make of
the article before using it; Lewis v. Terry, iii Cal. 39 (1896); Wellington v.
Downer Oil Co., io4 Mass. 64 (1870); Elkins etc. v. McKean, 79 Pa. 493(1875);
Skim v. Renter,'135 Mich. 57 (19o3); McCaffrey v. Mossberg Mfg. Co., 23 R.
1. 381 (go1).

It is astounding to find such a rank exuberance of the landowner's privilege, as that of permitting a landowner, though not an owner of a chattel, to
allow those whom he gratuitously permits to use his property to remain in ig-.
norance of conditions which he knows makes the acceptance of his apparent
favor dangerous to them. flourishing in America and particularly in New England,
originally 'ettled by "pilgrims" who left England to escape the dominance of a
landowing aristocracy.
29It is only in those jurisdictions which still follow Chief Justice Bigelow's
opinion in Sweeney v. Old Colony Railroad (see ante 69 U. of Pa. Law Rev.
p. 246) in so far as it held that a landowner owes no duty to any persons except
those whom he invites to come upon his premises, other than to refrain from.
inflicting upon them wanton reckless or intentiona harm, that it is necessary
to imply an invitation extended to those entitled to enteri the premises to use as
an approach so much of the premises, whether wrought way or front yard, as
is made to appear to be the usual means of access to the premises. Learoy,
executor v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315 (1885) and Gordon v. Cumming, 152 Mass.
513 (189o).

It "issubmitted that the owners apparent preparation or appropriation
of a part of his premises as the approach to the buildings thereon is taken to
amount to an "invitation" which is important, not as creating a right to enter
the premises, but. as justifying one, otherwise entitled to enter without either
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licensee. It is enough that the conditions are created or
maintained by the owner, and that he actually permits
persons, who have no reason to expect to encounter such
perils, to use a part of his premises where he knows they
exist. It is only when the injured person is a trespasser
that he must prove that the trap was prepared in anticipation of his intrusion and for the purpose of injuring him
if he does intrude.

This liability is not confined to the

invitation or permission, to assume that the particular part of the premises
over which he makes his entry, having obviously prepared or set aside by the
owner as an approach, will not have upon it any conditions not usual to such
approaches. Apparently the term "invitation" is used to give conformity to
the opinion in Sweeney v. R. R., which up to that time had not been modified
in Massachusetts, as ii later was, by adopting the English view that the owner's
interest in the visit and not the fact of invitation was the distinguishing factor
between business "invitees" and bare "licensees."
But recognizing the sense
in which the term "invitation" is used, and the effect given it by Mr. Justice
Holmes, the decision in Learoyd v. Godfrey is in substance to the same effect
as that of the New York Court of Appeals in Meiers v. Koch Brewery.
In England and in those American jurisdictions which follow its more
humane and sensible view, it should be enough that the plaintiff being upon the
premises of right encountered and was injured by a "trap" knowingly created
or maintained by the owner thereon.
Even in those jurisdictions, and they are many, in which Chief Justice
Bigelow's opinion is followed in so far, but only in so far, as it divides persons
admitted by. an owner into sheep and goats, "invitees" and "licensees," but
makes the test of-the right of admission to the favored class depend upon the
owner's interest in the visit rather than upon the fact that he has suggested it
by word or preparation, it is submitted that it is entirely proper to give to the
preferred status of "business invitees" to those public officers, whose entry
the owner is bound to tolerate because the character of his business, like that in
Anderson etc. Co. v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196 (jP 9 8) and "The City of Naples, 69 Fed.
794 (1895), makes it unlawful for him to carry it on without government inspection. Still more would it be so, where an owner to secure good order at somne
exhibition held or game played on his land, procured for the protection of his
patrons the attendance a corps of policemen. So, a steamshipcompany can not
lawfully land its foreign passengers or freight without the presenceofcustom
house officers and therefore their presence when a vessel docks is as closely
connected with the company's business use of its land as the visits of innumerable kinds of visitors who are held to be "business invitees," are connected with
the owner's use of other business premises. But it is perhaps doubtful whether
a customs officer lurking upon a clock at night to detect possible smuggling
ought to be so treated. It would seem that his entry was not necessary for the
lawful carrying on of the company's business. The nature of their business made
it probable that smuggling might be (lone there, but equally freight yards are
notoriously the scene of a great deal cf theft and pilfering and fights are apt to
occur in bar-rooms. Yet it would he far fetched to hold that the entry of the
police to catch a thief or to stop a fight was ancillory to and for the purpose of
the railroad's use of its yards or the saloon keeper's use of his bar-room. "
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owners and occupiers of land, it attaches to "any person
yho creates such a 'trap' upon the land of another."36
Even those courts who deny to persons entering another's premises in the exercise of some independent right
of their own a protection equal to that which they grant
to those who enter by the owner's invitation and for his
business purpose, should not deny to them at least the same

protection which they accord to a bare licensee in whose
visit the owner has no interest. At the least, they are in
the premises rightfully and should not be placed under thedisadvantages properly imposed upon trespassers, who unlawfully appropriate to themselves the use of another's
land.
FrancisH1.
Bohlen.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
30"If a person creates a dangerous condition of things (something in the
nature of a concealed trap) whether in a public highway or on his own premises
or on those of another and he sees some other person who, to his knowledge, is
unaware of the existence of the danger, lawfully exposing himself or about to
expose himself to the danger which he has created, he is in duty bound to give
such person a warning," Bankes, L. J., Kimber v. Gas Light & Coke Co., Ltd.,
L. R. (9zg8) i K. B. 439 P. 444.
If, as in Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. S56 (t8s8), the danger so created is
so far permanent as to continue after the creator has left the place, he must
place equally permanent physical warnings, in that case lights, to show the
presence of building material piled in private driveway.
It may be suggested that-a permn having the right to go upon the premises
of another irrespective of the owner's consent should in some respects be in a
more favorable position than even a business guest, and that urlder the broad
principle announced in Meirs v. Koch Brewery, even notice, as by lighting,
might
not he aassumption
sufficient performance
of the
duty.
the doctrine
of voluntary
of risk ought
not owner's
to apply,
since To
thehim
owner
can not
exclude him, lie cannot even by notice of the danger force him to an election
to forgo his use of the road or to take upon himselfthe riskof the dangersinvolved
in
It would
seem that
it would
from ofthereason.
ingitsof ,eftive
the courtcondition.
that he woul
be entitled
to recover
hadfollow
he known
this coal
hole
and and
had great
been thhat
injured*
attemptinlgof to
it unless
the justify
danger him
was in
so
manifest
the inimportane
hispass
errand
would not
running it, or unless he had not taken that additional care in attempting to pass
the obstruction which its dangerous character required. "It may be further
suggested that if there was no other way of reaching the fire the danger to the
-whole community of a.conflagration would ustify him in takingaheavychance
in attempting to use the only available road.
d
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